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Abstract We explore the proposition that parametric interdependence makes learn-
ing-by-doing a nondeterministic, path-dependent process. The implications of our
model challenge two conventional beliefs about the relationships between industrial
structure, spillovers, and learning-by-doing. First, we challenge the belief that the
monopolistic industrial structure always maximizes learning-by-doing gains when
there are no spillovers. Second, we challenge the belief that increasing spillovers
unambiguously increases welfare when learning-by-doing drives innovation.
Keywords Learning-by-doing · Industrial structure · Spillovers · NK landscape ·
Parametric interdependencies
1 Introduction
Parametric interdependency exists when the optimal setting of one parameter is im-
pacted by the current setting of other parameters. For example, what is the optimal
arrangement of magnets in an electric motor? The answer depends in part on whether
the motor will run on AC or DC current. A magnet setting that is optimal on an AC
motor might not work at all on a DC motor. Hence, there is an interdependency be-
tween the magnet placement and motor’s current; the optimal magnet placement is
dependent on the current.
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There is evidence that such interdependencies between technology parameters are
widespread. Fleming and Sorenson (2001) proposed a technique for estimating the
level of interdependence in a technology covered by a patent. In their analysis, they
found evidence of parametric interdependence in all of the 17,264 patents they ana-
lyzed. Given the prevalence of parametric interdependence, it is important to consider
the impact of parametric interdependencies on models of innovation and learning.
The extent of interdependence among components or parameters of a technol-
ogy is understood to impact that technology’s development (Kauffman et al. 2000).
There has been prior work considering the impact of parametric interdependencies
on learning-by-doing (cf. Auerswald 2010; Auerswald et al. 2000) and incremen-
tal innovation (Zhang and Gao 2010). However, prior work in this area has not ad-
dressed the socially optimal industrial structure, nor has it addressed the optimal
level of spillovers. We argue that parametric interdependencies can moderate the re-
ceived wisdom in both of these areas. Our arguments are predicated on the assertion
that parametric interdependencies make technological innovation a nondeterministic,
path-dependent process.
To illustrate the intuition behind this assertion, reconsider the electric motor dis-
cussed above. Assume an engineer tasked with maximizing a motor’s initial torque
begins with the erroneous belief that DC motors produce the highest initial torque.
All of her design decisions would maximize the initial torque of a DC motor. In real-
ity, the highest initial torque motors use AC current. However, if after optimizing the
motor using DC current the engineer were to simply switch to AC current, the initial
torque in her DC-optimized motor would likely decrease; indeed the motor might not
work at all. She would need to simultaneously change most of the motor’s design
parameters to see a benefit from switching to AC power. Therefore, it is unlikely that
trial-and-error would lead the engineer to discover the optimality of AC power once
she starts making incremental improvements along the DC power path.
The trial and error development of technologies with parametric interdependen-
cies are thus a path-dependent process, because decisions made in early trials can
limit possible technology outcomes. This path dependency also implies that the pro-
cess is nondeterministic. The particular path followed can be as important as the
number of trials executed. For example, if the above engineer began down the path of
incrementally improving a DC power motor, then 10,000 trials might produce a less
efficient motor than would 1,000 trials using the AC power motor.
Parametric interdependencies are not the only phenomenon that can render tech-
nology development a path dependent process. For example, when decision makers
become too deeply focused on particular mechanisms or type of technology, they
may lack the mental categories needed to incorporate alternatives. This process is
illustrated in Fioretti (2006), which uses a Kohonen neural network to demonstrate
how rigid mental categories can prevent firms from recognizing investments in supe-
rior technologies. In such cases, the path dependency is not driven by the nature of
the technology, but rather by the rigidity of the decision makers’ thinking. Insofar as
the impacts of these processes are complementary, we will focus our discussion on
the role of technological parametric interdependences.
In this paper we present a model that illustrates two implications parametric in-
terdependencies. First, we demonstrate that learning-by-doing in the monopolistic
industrial structure explores fewer technology development paths than it does an
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oligopolistic industrial structure. Therefore, the expected efficacy of the best spec-
ification of a technology uncovered by an oligopolistic structure is greater than that
of a monopolistic structure. Second, increasing the rate and breadth of spillovers does
not necessarily improve an industries development of a technology.
2 Theory
2.1 Industrial structure
The impact of industrial structure on innovation has been a topic of central interest
since Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1959). Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) present
a model that suggests a monopolistic industrial structure maximizes the gains from
learning-by-doing when spillovers are limited. The intuition behind this view is ap-
pealing: if knowledge derived through learning-by-doing is non-decreasing in expe-
rience, then the knowledge generated by a firm with a monopolistic market share is
at least as great as the knowledge that would be generated by any firm if the indus-
try were more competitive. Notably, Dasgupta and Stiglitz’s (1988) model does not
allow for technological parametric interdependencies.
We develop the proposition that parametric interdependency moderates the rela-
tionship between industrial structure and learning-by-doing. Contrary to Dasgupta
and Stiglitz (1988), when the underlying technology exhibits parametric interdepen-
dencies, we posit that an increase in the number of firms in the industry increases
the expected efficacy of the technology developed in the long run. This is because an
increase in the number of firms in an industry decreases the probability that all firms
get locked into the same low-outcome technology development path.
This notion of getting locked into a low-outcome technology development path is
illustrated in an example provided by Henderson and Clark (1990). Henderson and
Clark examined the development of photolithographic aligners for the production of
solid-state semiconductor devices. A technology start-up named Kesper Instruments
was an early leader in that market. Kesper’s high performing technology featured
“contact” aligners as opposed to “proximity” aligners. Kesper was aware of the “prox-
imity” approach, and in 1973 Kesper offered a “proximity” setting on their “contact”
aligners. However, their aligners worked best in the “contact” settings. In the late
1970s, Cannon introduced aligners that were designed to work as “proximity” align-
ers. Although all the component technology in Cannon’s “proximity” aligners had
been available to Kesper for almost a decade, the design decisions embodied in Can-
non’s approach were different from that in Kesper’s. Cannon’s products proved to be
far superior, and Kesper exited the industry in 1981.
Parametric interdependencies inhibited Kesper’s ability to remain at the fore-
front of this technology. Had Kesper re-optimized every design decision around the
premises that “proximity” aligners were superior to “contact” aligners, they might not
have been so vulnerable to Cannon’s technology threat. However, when their initial
experiments with “proximity” aligners failed to increase the efficacy of their technol-
ogy, Kesper moved on in search of other incremental innovations. If Cannon had not
entered this industry, and Kesper became a monopolist, we might still be stuck with
suboptimal “contact” aligner technology.
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The Kesper example demonstrates that R&D driven technology development
can get locked into a low-outcome technology path, but this phenomenon is even
more likely with learning-by-doing driven development. Learning-by-doing typi-
cally changes fewer parameters simultaneously, increasing the odds that firms will
get stuck with a globally suboptimal technology when parametric interdependencies
are present. Innovations derived from learning-by-doing are also less likely to be di-
rected; consider innovations derived from accidental process deviations on the shop
floor. As such, the learning-by-doing process is more likely to lead two firms down
different technology paths when parametric interdependencies are present.
The notion that different firms developing the same technology could get stuck
with different globally suboptimal instantiations of the technology implies that the
expected efficacy of the best technology developed by the industry will decrease as
industrial concentration increases. (The expected value of one die role is lower than
the expected value of the better of two die roles.) This insight can be formalized as
follows:
Proposition 1 In the long run, the expected efficacy of the technology uncovered by a
monopolistic structure is less than the expected value of the technology of a baseline
oligopolistic structure if parametric interdependencies are present.
2.2 Spillovers
There is strong empirical evidence for the existence of spillovers (Bernstein and
Nadiri 1989; Irwin and Klenow 1994; Jaffe 1986; Lieberman and Montgomery 1988,
p. 43; Mansfield 1985). Classic microeconomic work emphasizes the spillovers’
potential to reduce the incentives for R&D (e.g. Spence 1984). More recent work
deemphasizes spillovers as a potential deterrent to R&D. For example, Cohen and
Levinthal (1989) argue that R&D builds absorptive capacity, which enables a firm to
exploit spillovers. Rivkin (2000) provides a computational model that demonstrates
why complex strategies or technologies can be difficult to unilaterally imitate. Pyka
et al. (2009) use a computational model to demonstrate the stability of a system in
which innovating firms voluntary choose to enable spillovers within innovation net-
works.
A similar progression is seen in the work on learning-by-doing. Early works
(e.g. Spence 1981) examined the possibility that the learning gains from spillovers
might cause firms to reduce production. More recent work focuses on non-strategic
learning-by-doing, in which spillovers do not discourage production or capital invest-
ment. Jin et al. (2004) consider the impact of spillovers on non-strategic learning-by-
doing. Their model suggests that increasing spillovers is an unambiguously desirable
policy goal, because they both reduce shakeouts and limit the welfare implications of
those shakeouts that occur. The model presented in Randon and Naimzada (2006) is
congruous to this view.
Our model suggests that enhancing actionable spillovers beyond a critical point
can decrease the gains from non-strategic learning-by-doing when parametric inter-
dependencies are present. When spillovers are actionable, complete, and instanta-
neous, all firms will end up on the same development path. However, if spillovers are
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Fig. 1 Parametric interdependencies and path dependencies
limited then it is possible that different firms will travel down different technology
paths. Following the logic of the section above, when parametric interdependencies
are present, the expected efficacy of the best technology eventually discovered in-
creases with the number of technology development paths explored. This notion is
formalized as follows:
Proposition 2 When parametric interdependencies are present in a technology that
oligopolists are developing through learning-by-doing, there exists a critical level of
actionable spillovers. Beyond the critical point, increases in spillovers decrease the
expected efficacy of the best technology discovered.
3 Model
3.1 Parametric interdependencies and NK landscapes
Performance landscapes are a useful tool in modeling the impact of parametric in-
terdependencies. Kauffman (1993) introduced the concept of a “technological fit-
ness landscape”, or technology performance landscape, as a repurposing of Sewell
Wright’s (1932) concept of a fitness landscape. Fitness landscapes are N + 1 dimen-
sional topologies, in which each of the first N dimensions represents a design pa-
rameter of the technology under development. The final N + 1th “fitness” dimension
is a measure of efficiency, or technological efficacy, associated with each possible
instantiation of the technology.
For performance landscapes in which all of the non-fitness dimensions are dis-
crete (i.e., the first N dimensions), we can conceptualize a peak as a technology
specification at which changing the setting of any C (or fewer) parameters lowers the
technology’s efficacy. C is a constant, whose value is typically one. When a land-
scape exhibits multiple peaks with various heights, the landscape can be said to be
rugged or complex. Conversely, if there is only one peak on a landscape (i.e., the
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global optimum), then that landscape is said to be smooth. If a landscape is rugged,
it necessarily implies that there are parametric interdependencies.
It is the ruggedness of the landscape that engenders the path dependency discussed
in the introduction and theory sections. This notion is illustrated in Fig. 1.
It is intractable to specify a performance landscape for every real world technol-
ogy. Therefore, researchers frequently identify classes of relevant landscapes and use
stochastic simulation techniques to generate thousands of landscapes within each
class (see Auerswald 2010; Auerswald et al. 2000; Frenken 2006; Kauffman et al.
2000; Lobo and Macready 1999; Zhang and Gao 2010).
NK landscapes (Kauffman 1993) constitute a class of landscapes commonly used
to examine the impact of parametric interdependencies on technology development.
NK landscapes are a family of well-defined landscapes in which the level of in-
terdependence among parameters can be easily adjusted. Although NK landscapes
were designed to model the fitness of protean chains, Kauffman (1988) proposes us-
ing generalized NK landscapes to represent the technology embedded in products.
Kauffman et al. (2000) argue that NK landscapes can be used to represent technol-
ogy landscapes.1 The proposition that NK landscapes can represent a technology
landscape, a strategy landscape, or the contours of the “firm’s problem” is widely
applied in the literature (cf. Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell 2010; Auerswald
et al. 2000; Fang et al. 2010; Frenken 2006; Frenken and Nuvolari 2004; Gavetti
et al. 2005; Ganco and Hoetker 2009; Kauffman et al. 2000; Kollman et al. 2000;
Lenox et al. 2007; Levinthal 1997; Lobo and Macready 1999; Lobo et al. 2004;
Marengo et al. 2000; Rivkin 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow 2002, 2005; Zhang and
Gao 2010). NK landscapes are also frequently used as a model of team interaction
(cf. Carroll and Burton 2000; Lacks 2004; Solow et al. 2005).
An NK landscape maps a vector of N binary elements (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xN ) to one
continuous fitness variable F(x). Each element, xi , takes a value of either one or
zero, and represents one parameter in the technology’s specification. The fitness of a
position on the landscape is the summation of N functions, gi . The function gi is de-
pendent on the value of xi , and the value of K other parameters, x−i . The total fitness
associated with a particular location is the summation of each element’s contribution:
F(x) = g1(x1,x−1) + g2(x2,x−2) + · · · + gN(xN,x−N) (1)
To generate an NK landscape, each element, xi , is randomly assigned K other ele-
ments, x−i . There are 2K+1 possible values of (xi,x−i ), each of which is assigned a
value drawn randomly from a uniform [0,1] distribution. Let RD(x∗i ,x∗−i ) equal the





) = RD(x∗i ,x∗−i
)
/N (2)
When K equals zero, gi is only a function of xi . Hence, there is no parametric in-
terdependence, and the maximum fitness difference between two adjacent points is
1Kauffman et al. (2000) actually proposed a new landscape, called the “Ne technology landscape”. How-
ever, their Ne technology landscape is mathematically equivalent to the NK landscapes used in this paper.
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1/N .2 When K equals zero, the fitness function, F(x), is perfectly linear, and there
is exactly one local optimum.
K is literally a quantitative measure of the number of parametric interdependen-
cies in the landscape. As the value of K increases, the greater the degree of paramet-
ric interdependency in the technology, and the greater the expected fitness difference
between two adjacent points on the landscape. Also, as the value of K increases,
the expected number of peaks (i.e., local optimum) increases. In the context of an
NK landscape, a peak, or local optimum, refers to a location from which no single
change in one parameter can increase the fitness.
It is important to note that the absolute value of the fitness associated with each
point on the landscape is not interpretable in isolation. The average fitness associated
with a point on the landscape is a function of K and N . As a result, it is most mean-
ingful to view the value of each point as a percentage of the value of the highest peak
on the landscape. Hence, the highest peak is given a value of 1, and a point whose
value is half of the highest peak is given a value of 0.5.
3.2 A search-based model of learning-by-doing
The concept of learning-by-doing has been illustrated in many ways. First, the clas-
sic learning curve model implies that productivity is an exponential function of ex-
perience, and has been applied to the increases in productivity of those individuals
who perform multiple repetitive tasks (Adler and Clark 1991; Chambers and Kou-
velis 2003). Second, experiential learning-by-doing, identified as first-order learning
by Adler and Clark (1991), includes incremental development of expertise resulting
from the production process. Third, Arrow’s (1962) paper on learning-by-doing de-
notes that learning arising from the act of production provides the ability to identify
problems from which solutions can be generated over time.
We promote the view put forth by Young (1993), which argues that technical
change is the serendipitous result of production experience. Incremental improve-
ments lead to increased productivity due to learning-by-doing on the “shop floor”
by production workers (Adler and Clark 1991; Auerswald et al. 2000; Dasgupta and
Stiglitz 1988; Zollo and Winter 2002). Through continuous repetition of operating
routines, employees are able to identify methods to improve their portion of pro-
duction on the shop floor. The accumulation of this tacit knowledge generated by
repetitive tasks leads to incremental improvement (Zollo and Winter 2002).
Learning-by-doing is frequently represented with computational models (cf.
Ahrweiler et al. 2011; Péli and Nooteboom 1997). Our approach is in line with that of
Auerswald (2010) and Auerswald et al. (2000). We model learning-by-doing as a lo-
cal, myopic search process. From this perspective, we are unconcerned with whether
the discoveries are serendipitous (cf. Young 1993) or the result of routines developed
to identify improvements (cf. Zollo and Winter 2002). In either case, slight alterations
embodying incremental improvements may be adapted. The initial state of a firm’s
2Adjacent points on an NK landscape are points whose value is identical in all but one of the N dimensions.
For example, the point (1,1,1) is adjacent to the points (0,1,1), (1,0,1), and (0,0,1) on a landscape where
N equals three.
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technology is represented as a randomly chosen point on the NK performance land-
scape described in section three-one. Experience, or learning-by-doing, is assumed
to provide insight into the impact of a low dimensional alteration to the technology’s
specification. Hence, one of the first N dimensions will be selected at random and
flipped.3,4 If the one-dimensional flip fails to increase the efficacy of the firm’s tech-
nology, the alteration is rejected and the firm’s position in the NK landscape remains
unchanged. However, if the alteration does increase the efficacy of the firm’s tech-
nology, the change is adopted. When a change is adopted, the firm effectively moves
to a new point on the NK landscape. The next iteration of learning-by-doing begins
from this new point, not the original point.
We believe the simple search process above captures the salient features of the
learning-by-doing process described at the start of this section. First, experience pro-
vides insight into a change that might increase efficiency. An experiment is used to
reject or confirm the insight. If the experiment does confirm the insight, the change
is adopted and incorporated into the new starting point for future insights and exper-
iments.
To operationalize the difference between learning-by-doing in a monopolistic
structure and an oligopolistic structure, we create two search algorithms employing
the above learning-by-doing search process. In the oligopolistic search algorithm,
there are two firms. Each firm executes the above search process once per time pe-
riod. In our initial experiments, the firms operate independently and do not share
information. In the monopolistic search algorithm there is only one firm, which ex-
ecutes the above search process twice per time period. This difference captures the
notion that the monopolist produces more and hence has more opportunities to learn
by doing.
Our baseline model includes a number of assumptions. Specifically:
• Each firm starts with a different initial instantiation, chosen at random from all
possible locations on the landscape.
• Search is strictly local. When firms execute the learning-by-doing search process
described above, they only consider changing one parameter at a time.
• There are no spillovers. Each firm develops the technology in isolation.
• Total industry output is identical under the monopolistic and oligopolistic struc-
tures.
• Each oligopolist produces exactly half of total output.
• Each firm develops only one instantiation of the technology. Hence, the monop-
olist does not operate multiple factories with each factory developing a unique
instantiation of the technology.
After establishing a baseline, we relax each of the first three assumptions. Relaxing
the first two assumptions does not qualitatively change our findings. The implication
of the third assumption is a topic of extensive analysis in the following sections.
3The proofs in the Appendix generalize the first proposition to allow search in which the maximum number
of simultaneous parameter changes is less than the total number of parameters.
4If the value of the selected dimension was originally one, it becomes zero. Conversely, if the value was
originally zero, it becomes one.
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Assumption four is a point of departure from many models examining the impact
of industrial structure. However, relaxing this assumption would only strengthen our
findings. Assumption five is made for convenience. As demonstrated in the proofs
in the Appendix, assumption five does not impact our findings. The implications of
assumption six are discussed in the concluding section.
4 Results and analysis
4.1 Industrial structure
The results are scaled as a percentage of the highest point on the landscape. Hence,
the global peak has a value of 1. A point corresponding to an instantiation of the
technology that was only 80 % as effective as the best instantiation would have a
value of 0.8.
Figure 2 displays the average results of 1000 runs of the baseline model with K
equal to zero, and hence no parametric interdependencies.5 The x-axis displays the
number of time steps, and the y-axis displays the efficacy of the best technology un-
covered by each structure. In this case, both the monopolistic and oligopolistic mech-
anisms uncover the global peak. However, the monopolistic structure reaches the peak
first since it produces twice the output of each oligopolist. This finding is parsimo-
nious with the received wisdom regarding industrial structure and learning-by-doing;
when there are no parametric interdependencies and no spillovers, the monopolistic
structure is superior.
Figure 3 compares the performance of the two industrial structures when K equals
4; hence, parametric interdependencies are present in the technology being devel-
oped. In this case, the monopolistic structure initially outperforms the oligopolistic
structure, once again because it learns at twice the rate. However, this phenomenon
is short lived; the oligopolistic structure uncovers a better technology specification in
the long run.
The results displayed in Fig. 3, reflect the fact that increasing the number of firms
in the industry decreases the likelihood that a stochastic learning-by-doing process
will lead all firms to the same technology specification. Put another way, increasing
the number of firms in the industry increases the likelihood that at least one of them
will develop a better technology specification than a monopolist, such as Cannon’s
development of the proximity-optimized aligner technology.
Table 1 displays the frequency with which the long run performance of each in-
dustrial structure outperformed the other industrial structure as a percentage of the
1000 landscapes-trials generated for each value of K . Table 1 also shows the per-
centage of trials for which both industrial structures tied. Finally, Table 1 displays the
5We use the Mersenne Twister pseudo random number generator in these experiments. Despite their low
diffusion, MTs are preferred for this type of simulation analysis because of their exceptionally long cycle
length. The MT implemented in this simulation was coded by Anger Fog and distributes as a C++ library
class available at www.anger.org. The instantiation of the class used was last modified on 8/3/10. With
the exception of the pseudo random number generator, all other code was either part of the C++ standard
(“std”) library or coded by the authors.
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Fig. 2 No parametric interdependencies (N = 8,K = 0)
Fig. 3 With parametric interdependencies (N = 8,K = 4)
significance with which paired t-tests reject the following: (i) the hypothesis that the
mean efficacy of the technology uncovered by the monopolistic mechanism exceeds
that of the oligopolistic mechanism, (ii) the hypothesis that the mean efficacy of the
technology uncovered by the oligopolistic mechanism exceeds that of the monopo-
listic mechanism, and (iii) the hypothesis that the mean efficacy of the technology
uncovered by both structures is equal.
The results in Table 1 support Proposition 1. Specifically, the significance of the
paired t-tests in the “Oligopolist” column and the “Ties” column suggests that when
K is greater than zero, we can reject both the hypothesis that the mean efficacy of the
technology uncovered by the monopolistic mechanism exceeds that of the oligopolis-
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Table 1 Percentage of times each structure uncovers a superior technology
K Oligopoly Monopoly Ties
0 0.0 %a 0.0 %a 100.0 %a
2 48.4 %*** 17.0 % 34.6 %***
4 57.0 %*** 27.9 % 15.1 %***
6 62.2 %*** 31.0 % 6.8 %***
Notes: (1) Percentages in each cell are based on 1000 trials each with 1000 time steps. (2) Asterisks in
“Oligopoly” Column indicate the significance with which a paired t-test rejects the hypothesis that the
technologies uncovered by the monopolistic structure have a higher expected performance. (3) Asterisks
in “Monopoly” Column indicate the significance with which a paired t-test rejects the hypothesis that the
technologies uncovered by the oligopolistic structure have a higher expected performance. (4) Asterisks
in “Ties” Column indicate the significance with which a paired t-test rejects the hypothesis that the tech-
nologies uncovered by both structures have the same expected performance. (5) a Indicates that the paired
t-test cannot be calculated because all runs ended in ties. (6) *** p < 0.001
Table 2 Identical starting technologies & the percentage of times each structure uncovers a superior
technology
K Oligopoly Monopoly Ties
0 0.0 %a 0.0 %a 100.0 %a
2 29.2 %*** 12.0 % 58.8 %***
4 40.6 %*** 17.9 % 41.5 %***
6 43.1 %*** 19.3 % 37.6 %***
Notes: (1) Percentages in each cell are based on 1000 trials. (2) Asterisks in “Oligopoly” Column indicate
the significance with which a paired t-test rejects the hypothesis that the technologies uncovered by the
monopolistic structure have a higher expected performance. (3) Asterisks in “Monopoly” Column indicate
the significance with which a paired t-test rejects the hypothesis that the technologies uncovered by the
oligopolistic structure have a higher expected performance. (4) Asterisks in “Ties” Column indicate the
significance with which a paired t-test rejects the hypothesis that the technologies uncovered by both
structures have the same expected performance. (5) a Indicates that the paired t-test cannot be calculated
because all runs ended in ties. (6) *** p < 0.001
tic mechanism, and the hypothesis that the mean efficacy of the technology uncovered
by both structures is equal.
Table 2 provides full data in the model when all firms started with the same initial
technology. Hence, on each landscape, the monopolist and both of the oligopolists
began at the same initial location. As the results of Table 2 show, giving all firms
an identical initial technology does not qualitatively change the above results. These
results further confirm Proposition 1.
Following the results displayed in Tables 1 and 2, the Appendix offers a formal
proof of Proposition 1. Lemmas in the Appendix prove more generalized versions
of Proposition 1. One generalization increases the maximum number of parameters
simultaneously changed to any number below N . Another generalization shows that
the expected efficacy of the best technology developed by any firm in the industry
decreases as industrial concentration increases.
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Table 3 Impact of spillovers when firms start with different technologies




(# of time periods)
Oligopolist develops superior
technology (%) (Ties in parentheses)
0 of 8 NA 58.6 %*** (15.2 %)
2 of 8 0 56.5 %*** (14.5 %)
10 61.3 %*** (15.4 %)
35 63.7 %*** (15.6 %)
4 of 8 0 52.3 %*** (14.3 %)
10 60.3 %*** (15.6 %)
35 63.9 %*** (16.3 %)
8 of 8 0 44.2 % (12.5 %)
10 52.0 %*** (14.1 %)
35 58.2 %*** (15.2 %)
Notes: (1) “Oligopolist develops superior technology (%)” measures percent of trials in which the
oligopolistic structure uncovers a technology that is superior to that of the monopolistic structure. Percent
of trials that end with both structures uncovering equally effective technologies is reported in parentheses.
(2) Percentages reported in cells are based on 10,000 trials, with 2000 time steps each, on landscapes where
N = 8, K = 4. (3) Significance measures in this column report where a paired t-test rejects the hypothesis
that the monopolistic structure locates superior technologies. (4) *** p < 0.001
4.2 Spillovers
There are a number of different ways to add spillovers to our model. All involve per-
mitting an oligopolist the ability to see if its competitor’s technology is more efficient
than its own. If the competitor’s technology is more efficient, the firm can copy some
percentage of the competitor’s technology specification. Let X equal the number of
dimensions of a competitor’s technology that are subject to spillovers. If X equals N ,
then spillovers are complete. If X is less than N , then spillovers are partial. Partial
spillovers capture the idea that while some aspects of a technology are easy to copy,
others are either protected by intellectual property law, corporate secrets, or are oth-
erwise opaque. They also capture that the idea that some firms may lock-in to some
aspects of their technology. Some moves across the technology landscape may be too
far. Without loss of generality, we will assume that it is the first X dimensions that
are copied when spillovers are partial. In addition to whether spillovers are partial or
complete, we must also decide how quickly and frequently spillovers occur.
While many models assume spillovers are instantaneous, we also examine the ef-
fect of slower diffusion rates in addition to instantaneous spillovers. To operationalize
a slow diffusion rate, we let D equal the number of consecutive periods in which an
oligopolist must employ an inferior technology before copying from its rival. If D
equals zero, the spillovers are instantaneous. The higher the value of D, the lower the
spillover diffusion rate.
Table 3 compares the impact of various spillover models and the original monop-
olistic model when K equals 4 (i.e., some parametric interdependencies are present).
We use comparisons to the monopolistic model as baseline in order to facilitate com-
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Table 4 Impact of spillovers when firms start with identical technologies




(# of time periods)
Oligopolist develops superior
technology (%) (Ties in parentheses)
0 of 8 NA 41.2 %*** (42.5 %)
2 of 8 0 38.4 %*** (41.6 %)
10 42.9 %*** (41.2 %)
35 44.5 %*** (41.3 %)
4 of 8 0 34.3 %*** (41.7 %)
10 41.8 %*** (41.7 %)
35 45.2 %*** (40.9 %)
8 of 8 0 30.5 % (40.5 %)
10 36.2 %*** (41.9 %)
35 40.9 %*** (42.5 %)
Notes: (1) “Oligopolist develops superior technology (%)” measures percent of trials in which the
oligopolistic structure uncovers a technology that is superior to that of the monopolistic structure. Percent
of trials that end with both structures uncovering equally effective technologies is reported in parentheses.
(2) Percentages reported in cells are based on 10,000 trials, with 2000 time steps each, on landscapes where
N = 8, K = 4. (3) Significance measures in this column report where a paired t-test rejects the hypothesis
that the monopolistic structure locates superior technologies. (4) *** p < 0.001
parisons across different levels of spillovers for the oligopolistic model. The data in
Table 3 suggest that the oligopolistic structure’s advantage decreases as the diffu-
sion rate increases and the scope of spillovers increase. However, the oligopolistic
model with low scope of spillovers and slow diffusion can outperform the oligopolis-
tic model with no spillovers. This is because firms can benefit from other companies’
experiments without being locked into the same development path. Table 4 replicates
the results of Table 3 under the assumption that all firms start with the same technol-
ogy. Again, this assumption does not substantively alter the results.
As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the addition of instantaneous spillovers generally
decreases the benefit of the oligopolistic structure. This is consistent with the insights
of the baseline model; the value of the oligopolistic structure is derived from the
likelihood that it will uncover two different peaks. If rapid and rich spillovers increase
the likelihood that the two oligopolists will converge on the same peak, then spillovers
will decrease the advantages of the oligopolistic structure.
As we examine variants of the model in which spillovers have decreasing scope
and slower diffusion rates, Tables 3 and 4 suggest that slow and partial spillovers
are superior to no spillovers. When the interval between oligopolists incorporating
spillover knowledge is long (i.e., low diffusion rate), it is possible for each oligopolist
to near, or even reach, a peak before incorporating the information from spillovers.
In this case, the oligopolist that located the lower peak changes its technological
specification while the oligopolist that located the higher peak does not move. If
the spillover scope is also low, the oligopolist that located the lower peak does not
necessarily move to the peak identified by the more successful oligopolist. Hence,
with very low spillover diffusion and scope the oligopolist structure has even greater
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search range than it does in the baseline “no-spillover” instantiation. These results
support Proposition 2.
An example best illustrates why cases of low spillover scope with a low diffusion
rate can outperform cases of no spillovers. Consider a hypothetical case in which
N equals 8, K equals 2, the scope of spillovers is two parameters, and information
from spillovers are only assimilated if one firm’s technology has been inferior to the
other firm’s technology for 35 consecutive time steps. Assume that Oligopolist 2’s
technology has been inferior to that of Oligopolist 1’s for the first 35 time steps.
Further assume that both oligopolists have located peaks. Oligopolist 2 would then
replace the values of the first two dimensions of its technology with the values of the
first two dimensions of Oligopolist 1’s technology. After this change, the learning-by-
doing engendered local search might cause Oligopolist 2 to locate to Oligopolist 1’s
peak. However, it is also possible that the local search will lead Oligopolist 2 to
a new peak. If Oligopolist 2’s new peak is higher than Oligopolist 1’s peak, then
the oligopolistic structure’s performance on that landscape is higher than it would
have been in the absence of spillovers. If Oligopolist 2’s new peak is higher than
Oligopolist 1’s peak, and the new peak values in the first two dimensions of the new
technology differ from that of Oligopolist 1, the cycle begins again.
5 Conclusions
This paper makes two primary contributions. First, we demonstrate that when para-
metric interdependencies are present and spillovers are minimal, the monopolistic
industrial structure does not maximize technological gains from learning-by-doing.
Second, we demonstrate that when parametric interdependencies are present, there
is a level of actionable spillovers beyond which the technology gains from non-
strategic learning-by-doing decrease. These assertions are driven by the realization
that parametric interdependencies in the underlying technology make learning-by-
doing a nondeterministic, path-dependent process. As a result, the expected efficacy
of the best technology uncovered by an industry increases with the number of tech-
nology development paths followed by firms in that industry. Our assertions, both of
which refine the insights of previous works, are summarized in Table 5 below.
Because use most technologies exhibit some parametric interdependencies (Flem-
ing and Sorenson 2001), our findings have policy implications. First, our model helps
refine the policy implications of Jin et al. (2004). The model in Jin et al. examined the
impact of spillovers on ‘shakeouts,’ or events in which a significant number of firms
exit an industry. Jin et al. provides evidence that increasing spillovers reduces the
number of shakeouts, possibly because spillovers allow less efficient firms to catch
up with more efficient competitors. This insight motivates Jin et al.’s policy conclu-
sion; increasing spillovers is an unambiguous policy goal. Our model’s results are
congruent with this view when parametric interdependencies are minimal, or when
lock-in prevents firms from fully acting on spillovers. However, the picture is less
clear when the technology under development is subject to parametric interdepen-
dencies and firms are largely able to act on the information in spillovers. The ability
of spillovers to delay and soften the impact of shakeouts could be counteracted by the
suboptimal technologies to which they may lead.
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Enhances rate of technology
development (congruent with
Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1988)
Enhances rate of technology development
(policy implications congruent with
implications of Jin et al. 2004)
With parametric
interdependencies
Lowers expected efficacy of the
best technology uncovered
Broad and instantaneous spillovers lower
the expected efficacy of the best
technology uncovered. However the
expected efficacy of the best technology
uncovered with slow and partial spillovers
is higher than that without spillovers
While our results suggest that increasing spillovers does not always improve out-
comes, it would be imprudent to apply these insights to intellectual property policy.
As noted in the bottom right quadrant of Table 5, some spillovers are better than no
spillovers. Even absent intellectual property policies, spillovers are neither instanta-
neous nor complete. For example, spillovers can be limited by geographic constraints
(Audretsch and Feldman 1996) and firms’ absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal
1989). Whether the natural rate of spillovers is above or below the optimal level is
most likely a technology and industry specific question, which is be best addressed
by empirical research.
Our model has clearer policy implications for the “National Champions” model
of economic development. Under the National Champions model, governments often
support industrial consolidation in an attempt to grow a large domestic firm capable of
competing internationally. Our model suggests that such policies might limit the gains
derived from learning-by-doing; higher industrial concentration limits the number of
technology paths the industry explores. The impact of policies that promote consoli-
dation on innovation is a timely topic. China’s current National Champions policies
promote industrial consolidation in key industries (Guest and Sutherland 2010). Un-
like previous instances of state sponsored industrial consolidation, the Chinese gov-
ernment also promotes target levels of R&D spending on par with that of the United
States (Cao et al. 2006). Hence, the notion that industrial structure impacts the level
of innovation is not as relevant in the case of Chinese state owned enterprises. The
behavior of the model in this paper modestly suggests that path dependence might
limit the technological development achieved by this structure. One possible solution
is to limit the information flows between various work units within these National
Champions. Hence, from an information flow perspective, these monopolists would
function more like oligopolists. This is an area for future research.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
The simulation results in section four provide important insight into the model’s be-
havior. However, it is also illustrative to employ formal analytical analysis and flesh
out how the model’s mechanics corroborate our first proposition.
Proposition 1 In the long run, the expected value of the technology uncovered by the
baseline monopolistic structure is less than the expected value of the technology of a
baseline oligopolistic structure if parametric interdependencies are present.
Proof (in six steps)
(i) In the long run, firms will get stuck on a peak: Over a long enough timeline,
a myopic, local, “hill-climbing” algorithm, such as our learning-by-doing algo-
rithm, will eventually get stuck on a peak when searching any NK landscape.
The peak upon which the hill-climber gets stuck may or may not be the highest
peak. Once the hill-climber is stuck, additional time to search will not improve
the outcome (see Kauffman 1993, pp. 33–67). Note that we simply define “long
run” as a time period long enough to ensure that all of our learning-by-doing
search algorithms have reached a sticking point. Assuming the slowest algo-
rithm executes a search once per time step, the number of time steps needed to
fulfill this “long run criteria” can be bounded as less than the total area of the
landscape (i.e., 2N time steps).
(ii) In the long run, the expected behavior of the monopolist is identical to each of
the oligopolists: As noted in step (i), all our learning-by-doing algorithms will
eventually come to rest on a peak. In the baseline model, the behavior of all three
firms is fully independent. The only difference between the monopolistic search
algorithm and the search algorithm for each firm in the oligopolistic model is the
number of times the algorithm executes per time step: twice for the monopolist,
once for each oligopolist. If we were to redefine the units of our timeline from
“time steps” into “2time-steps,” such that each 2time-step equaled one time step,
the expected behavior of each oligopolist in this 2time-steps timeframe would
be identical to the behavior of the monopolist in normal timeframe. Again, as
noted in step (i), all our learning-by-doing algorithms will eventually come to
rest on a peak, after which the passing of additional time steps does not alter the
search behavior. Hence, if the timeline is sufficiently long (see note in step (i)),
the long run behavior of the monopolist and the oligopolist are identical.
(iii) A probability distribution can be defined over all peaks: For any generated NK
landscape, we can identify all the peaks upon which our learning-by-doing algo-
rithm could get stuck.6 Given that uniform probability distributions determine
both the firm’s initial location on the landscape and the algorithm’s search be-
havior, we can assign each peak a probability with which the algorithm will get
6Following Rivkin (2000), this can be accomplished by starting the algorithm on every point on the land-
scape, and recording the points from which the algorithm could not move.
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stuck on that particular point.7 Hence, we identify a probability distribution over
all the possible sticking points.
(iv) The value of the efficacy of the monopolist’s long run technology specification
and that of each of the oligopolists can be treated as an independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) random variable drawn from the distribution defined in
step (iii): This follows directly from the conclusions in steps (ii) and (iii).
(v) The expected performance of the oligopolist is at least as good as that of the
monopolist: Let D denote a random variable drawn from the distribution iden-
tified in step (iii). The expected performance of the monopolist is E[Dm]. The
expected performance of the oligopolist is E[maxDO1,DO2]. Dm, DO1, and
DO2 are i.i.d. By basic probability theory:
E[maxDO1,DO2] ≥ E[Dm] (3)
Note: The above equality is strict whenever the range of the D contains more
than one element with a non-zero probability. Put another way, as long as there
is more than one sticking point on the landscape, the above equality is strict.
(vi) If there are parametric interdependencies (i.e., K > 0), the expected perfor-
mance of the oligopolist is better than that of the monopolist: When K is greater
than zero, it has been demonstrated that it is possible to generate a landscape
such that there exists at least one non-optimum sticking point for a local, my-
opic search algorithm (see Rivkin 2000).8 If we consider the expected values of
the technology located by each structure before the landscape is generated, we
have to admit the non-zero probability that the soon-to-be generated landscape
will have one or more non-optimal local sticking points. Hence, the inequality
in equation three becomes strict, leaving us with:
E[maxDO1,DO2] > E[Dm] (4)

Lemma 1 When there are no parametric interdependencies (i.e., K = 0), long run
values of technologies identified by both monopolistic and oligopolistic structures are
identical.
Proof When K = 0, there is only one sticking point in an NK landscape, its global
peak (Kauffman 1993). Hence, the long run probability that our learning gets stuck
on that one peak is exactly one, and the inequality in equation three becomes an
equality. 
Lemma 2 Proposition 1 holds even if all firms start with the same initial technology.
7The identification of such a distribution would be an arduous process, and the result would be specific
to a particular instantiation of the landscape. However, all we need for this proof is the existence of the
distribution.
8Note that the existence of sticking points that are not global optimums is not just possible, but likely. As
K increases, the difficulty in crafting a landscape that does not include multiple local peaks increases. In all
but the rarest cases, we would expect to find sticking points for a myopic, local, “hill-climber” algorithm
whenever K > 0.
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Proof Although the range will be more limited, the probability distribution described
in step (iii) for the proof of Proposition 1 can still be defined. The likelihood of there
being only one sticking point is greater when conditioned on the algorithm’s starting
location: some initial locations may lock a firm into a particular technology develop-
ment path. However, when K is greater than zero, there exist landscapes with starting
points that would not lock the firm into a particular development path.9 Hence, the
argument in step (vi) of the proof of Proposition 1 is still valid. The proof of Propo-
sition 1 can otherwise be replicated to prove Lemma 2. 
Lemma 3 As long as the scope of search is less than the dimensionality of the land-
scape, Proposition 1 will hold.
Proof Consider an NK landscape on which the optimal value for all N parameters
equals one. Assume that the second highest value on this landscape corresponds to
the position at which all N elements equal zero. This second assumption necessarily
implies that all positions that involve a mix of ones and zeros correspond to a lower
value than the top ranked “all ones” position and the second ranked “all zeros” po-
sition. If a local, myopic, “hill-climber” algorithm with the ability to simultaneously
move in N − 1 dimensions were to begin on the “all zeros” position, or wander to the
“all zeros” position, the algorithm would become stuck and be unable to ever reach
the “all ones” position. Although unlikely to be generated at random, the probability
of such a landscape’s generation is greater than zero. Hence, if we take our expecta-
tions of each structure’s performance before the landscape is generated, the inequality
described in equation four is still strict, and the reasoning in step (vi) of the proof of
Proposition 1 still holds. The proof of Proposition 1 can otherwise be replicated to
prove Lemma 3. 
Lemma 4 If parametric interdependencies are present in the underlying technology,
the expected long run value of the technology uncovered by an industry increases as
the number of firms in the industry increases.
Proof Without loss of generality, we will compare an industrial structure with A firms
to one with B firms, such that A < B . Assume that each of the A firms search faster
than each of the B firms and on average, each of the A firms have a larger market
share than each of the B firms. However, in light of our definition of “long run” as
being a time period long enough for the slowest algorithm to have reached a stick-
ing point, the different search speeds are immaterial. Using the variables defined in
the original proof, the expected value of the technology located by the industry with
A firms is then E[maxD1,D2, . . . ,DA]. The expected value of the technology lo-
cated by the industry with B firms is E[maxD1,D2, . . . ,DB ]. By simple probability
theory, as long as A < B ,
E[maxD1,D2, . . . ,DB ] ≥ E[maxD1,D2, . . . ,DA] (5)
9This assumes that the firms are using a one-dimensional, myopic, hill-climbing search algorithm, such
as those used to model learning-by-doing in this paper. There exist other search algorithms for which this
would not be true. For example, if firms used a “never move, no matter what” search algorithm, then every
possible starting point on every landscape would lock the firm into a particular “development” path.
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Substituting Eq. (5) for Eq. (3) in the proof of Proposition 1, the proof of Lemma 4
follows the proof of Proposition 1. 
Lemma 4 significantly increases the applicability of our findings. While our ar-
guments were built comparing a monopolistic structure to a duopolistic structure,
Lemma 4 asserts that our conclusions apply more broadly to the impact of industrial
concentration on learning-by-doing. As with step (ii) in the original proof, the proof
of Lemma 4 also highlights the role of time in this analysis. Lemma 4 does not require
the market share to be distributed equally among the firms, but the more unequal the
market share, the longer the timeline needed to obtain our results.
Lemma 5 The expected time needed for a monopolist to locate a peak is less than
that of a single oligopolist firm.
Proof One of the model’s principle assumptions is that the number of times the
learning-by-doing search algorithm executes a search per time step is an increas-
ing function of market share. The baseline monopolist (with 100 % market share)
executed two searches per time step, while each baseline oligopolist (each with 50 %
market share) executed one search per time step. As the search algorithms are oth-
erwise identical, the expected number of search executions needed to reach a peak
is identical between the monopolist and each oligopolist. Hence, the expected num-
ber of time steps needed for the monopolist to reach a peak is less than that of each
oligopolist. 
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